List of Articles Ibn Sīnā

• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  1 - A Critical Study of Haeri Yazdi’s View of the Sadrian Semantic Function of “Possibility” in Explaining the Sinan Argument of the Righteous
  Hamidreza  Khademi
  20.1001.1.15600874.1400.27.1.6.2
  The argument of the righteous (Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn) demonstrates the essence of the Necessary Being without resorting to an intermediary. This title was chosen for the first time by Ibn Sīnā in order to provide a new interpretation of an argument that Fārābī had previous More

  The argument of the righteous (Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn) demonstrates the essence of the Necessary Being without resorting to an intermediary. This title was chosen for the first time by Ibn Sīnā in order to provide a new interpretation of an argument that Fārābī had previously adduced. The argument of the righteous is one of the best and most concise philosophical and rational arguments on demonstrating the existence of God.This argument reasons from “being” to the “Necessary Being” so that none of God’s acts, such as motion or origination, functions as the middle term. Haeri Yazdi has tried to respond to the problems of this argument by explaining the meaning of possibility in the Peripatetic and Transcendent Schools of philosophy. Given his accurate analysis of the meaning of possibility, he believes that it can be used as a basis for proving the existence of the Necessary Being; therefore, it is not necessary to resort to the impossibility of infinite regression. Following an analytic comparative method and based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s valid criteria for the truth of the argument of the righteous, the present paper analyzes and examines Haeri Yazdi’s interpretation and shows that his view is not immune to criticism. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  2 - A Critical Study of Ibn Sīnā’s Arguments on the Materialism of Particular Perceptive Experience with an Emphasis on the Problem of “Explanatory Gap”
  Ahmad Va’ezi Mehdi  Karimi
  20.1001.1.15600874.1400.27.2.7.5
  By doubting the materiality of perceptions based on the problem of explanatory gap, a rational basis is provided for criticizing Ibn Sīnā’s arguments regarding the impossibility of the immateriality of particular perceptions, the demonstration of possibility, and also t More

  By doubting the materiality of perceptions based on the problem of explanatory gap, a rational basis is provided for criticizing Ibn Sīnā’s arguments regarding the impossibility of the immateriality of particular perceptions, the demonstration of possibility, and also the necessity of the immateriality of different types of perception. The material interpretation of particular perceptions – whether sensory or imaginal – is among Ibn Sīnā’s views in the ontology of perception. Through providing some arguments on the impossibility of the immateriality of particular perceptive experiences, he believes that the only possible state with respect to such experiences is their immateriality. On the other hand, hypothesizing the existence of a possible world in which a metaphysical state such as pain can be imagined in the absence of a neural process makes the distinction between mental state and neural process possible. This explanatory gap between them makes the immateriality of perception possible through negating the identity of these two phenomena. Given the distinction between physical and metaphysical states and the necessity of the immateriality of perception based on various philosophical arguments, the materiality of particular perception is debatable. Therefore, Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the immateriality of sensory and imaginal perception, similar to rational perceptions, presents a more comprehensive explanation of perception and the soul. This paper focus on a study of the whatness and ontology of particular perceptions, the discussion of which is subcategorized under the problem of the soul-body relation in the process of perception. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  3 - Circularity of the Definitions of Nature and Truth of Time in Ibn Sīnā’s View
  Hamid  Shahriari
  20.1001.1.15600874.1401.27.4.4.0
  Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khān More

  Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khānsārī, believe that the circular nature of Ibn Sīnā’s definition of time in this book poses no problem because the concept of time is an axiom, and the existence of circularity in the definition of an axiom is natural. His other definition has been given in al-Shifā. Here, the nature of time is defined in the sense of a measure of motion as divided into prior and posterior components. In this definition, time contains disjunctive quantity (time as the number of motion) in addition to continuous quantity (time as amount of motion). The present paper aims to provide a clear picture of the definition of the nature of time in Ibn Sīnā’s view in his al-Ishārāt and al-Shifā in al-Ṭabi’iyyāt chapter. Following an analytic comparative study of Ibn Sīnā’s works, the author concludes that Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s perception of Ibn Sīnā’s definitions of the nature of time were not inconsistent and, rather, he intended to provide another analysis of the truth of time. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  4 - God’s Knowledge of Particulars in the Views of Ibn Sīnā and Thomas Aquinas
  Mohammad Mahmoodi Hossein Kalbasi Ashtari
  20.1001.1.15600874.1401.28.2.8.3
  One of the fundamental questions in the field of philosophical theology is whether God has the knowledge of particulars. Some philosophers have tried to either demonstrate or deny the divine knowledge of particulars regardless of the term “God”, which is a controversial More

  One of the fundamental questions in the field of philosophical theology is whether God has the knowledge of particulars. Some philosophers have tried to either demonstrate or deny the divine knowledge of particulars regardless of the term “God”, which is a controversial issue. In a philosophical tradition that began with Plato and Aristotle and was advocated by Ibn Sīnā, the divine knowledge of particulars is denied. However, within the framework of the same philosophical school, Thomas Aquinas, as a theologian, demonstrates this knowledge for God. In Ibn Sīnā’s view, there is a fundamental difference between quiddity and existence as two different levels of being. The Necessary Being is the cause of granting existence to quiddities and, thus, cannot know them in terms of their particulars, as they lack “existence” in separation from Him. However, Ibn Sīnā does not deny the divine knowledge of particulars through their “existence”. In Aquinas’ theological concept of God, as a personal God, the denial of the divine knowledge of particulars defaces the divine power. Moreover, in case of denying this Knowledge, Man, who is created by God, will be placed at a higher level than their Creator because they can gain the knowledge of particulars. Aquinas, who speaks as a theologian here, ignores the borderline between philosophy and theology and objects to Ibn Sīnā by stating that some universals such as “animal” and “human” cannot function as the distinctive features of a particular such as “Socrates” in comparison to others. The present paper provides a comparative analysis of the views of these two philosophers regarding God’s knowledge of particulars. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  5 - A Study of Ibn Sīnā’s Argument on the Accidental Nature of Unity in Ilāhīyyāt al-Shifā’
  Mihammadhadi Tavakoli
  20.1001.1.15600874.1402.28.3.5.6
  According to Aristotle, a number of philosophers in ancient Greece theorized that the “one” is an independent substance that performs a causal role in relation to other substances. Through clarifying the predicative nature of the “one” and referring to the false consequ More

  According to Aristotle, a number of philosophers in ancient Greece theorized that the “one” is an independent substance that performs a causal role in relation to other substances. Through clarifying the predicative nature of the “one” and referring to the false consequences of the above theory, he tried to reject it. Ibn Sīnā has extensively investigated the theory of the one’s being a substance and Aristotle’s related criticisms in the ilāhīyyāt section of al-Shifā’. Unlike Aristotle, he has not merely referred to the one’s being a predicate and, rather, through a lengthy and complex argument, has tried to demonstrate that unity, as the source of the derivation of the one, is a necessary accident. Ibn Sīnā’ argument is prone to criticism from different aspects, the most important of which is the confusion of categorical and analytic accidents with each other. Unity is merely an analytic accident, and Ibn Sīnā’s argument is incapable of demonstrating its being a categorical accident. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  6 - An Analysis of the Ascension of the Holy Prophet (ṣ) of Islam Based on the Philosophical Principles of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā
  Maryam Samadieh Abdulrazzaq  Hessamifar
  20.1001.1.15600874.1402.28.3.6.7
  In the view of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, the Prophet’s ascension was an indisputable truth, and those who deny it are among unbelievers and deviators from the right path. Ibn Sīnā believes that the Prophet’s ascension was not corporeal because the body cannot traverse a More

  In the view of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, the Prophet’s ascension was an indisputable truth, and those who deny it are among unbelievers and deviators from the right path. Ibn Sīnā believes that the Prophet’s ascension was not corporeal because the body cannot traverse a very long distance in a moment. Thus, it was intellectual and spiritual. In other words, as the route of the Prophet’s ascension passed through immaterial worlds, one cannot consider this journey a corporeal one. However, Mullā Ṣadrā explicitly speaks of the corporeal quality of the Prophet’s presence in ascension. He believes in the corporeal presence of the Prophet (ṣ) in his heavenly journey as well as the corporeal nature of what happened to him in the night of ascension. Nevertheless, their corporeality is in proportion to the worlds in which the Prophet (ṣ) travelled. Mullā Ṣadrā considers three types of body for human beings: rational, Ideal, and elemental. He maintains that earthly journey is of the elemental type, and heavenly journey is of the Ideal and rational types. He also believes that the Prophet (ṣ) wore the corporeal attire in conformity with the worlds to and through which he travelled. This paper investigates and analyzes the quality of the Prophet’s presence in the night of ascension and the otherworldly things that happened to him during that night following a descriptive-analytic approach and based on the views of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  7 - Place of Intuitive Method in Islamic Philosophy
  Rasoul  Naderi
  20.1001.1.15600874.1402.29.2.7.9
  Islamic philosophy is mainly identified by its use of demonstration and method. However, a study of philosophical texts in Islamic tradition indicates that the intuitive method holds an important place in this field. This method employs gnostic intuition and unveiling i More

  Islamic philosophy is mainly identified by its use of demonstration and method. However, a study of philosophical texts in Islamic tradition indicates that the intuitive method holds an important place in this field. This method employs gnostic intuition and unveiling in order to attain certain knowledge. The intuitive method was used in all the three major schools of Islamic philosophy; nevertheless, it was employed systematically and in an organized fashion for the first time in the Transcendent Philosophy. While emphasizing the use of rational method, Mullā Ṣadrā has also benefitted from the intuitive method to a large extent. The functions of this method are employed in two contexts: discovery and justification. In the context of discovery, Muslim philosophers have utilized the intuitive method to explain new philosophical problems and present a correct picture of some philosophical issues. In the context of justification, they have used it to discover middle terms, unveil fallacies, reconstruct demonstration, amend conclusions, and demonstrate rational arguments. Manuscript profile